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LIEN-STRIPPING IN THE ABSENCE OF A
DISCHARGE: BANKRUPTCY’S ANSWER TO
THE DESTRUCTION CAUSED BY
EXCESSIVE HOME EQUITY EXTRACTION
GREGORY J. GUEST*
I.

INTRODUCTION: THE FOUNDATIONS OF A MORTGAGE CRISIS

There is still a tremendous amount of capacity for refinancing and
an enormous amount of home equity available to be tapped . . . .
People will have more spending power either from the cash taken
out or from reduced mortgage payments, which will increase their
discretionary spending capabilities.1
But your home equity isn’t free money that is just lying around,
waiting for you to “tap” it. . . . In reality, your home equity is more
like the “equity” in your grandmother’s jewelry. . . . You realize it
has some value, let’s say $1000 on the open market. But there is
only one way you can have $1000: Sell the jewelry. Sell it or keep it,
but “tapping” is just a fiction.2

* JD, The John Marshall Law School, 2013; BA in Philosophy of Law, Lewis
University, 2009. This Comment is dedicated to my wife, Elizabeth Guest, for
all of the prayers, love, and encouragement throughout my time in law school.
I also extend gratitude to my family for their support and to THE JOHN
MARSHALL LAW REVIEW Editorial Board for its assistance in preparing this
Comment for publication.
1. Minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee Meetingon June 24-25,
2003, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. SYS. 117 (June 24-25, 2003),
http://www.
federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/FOMC20030625meeting.pdf.
2. ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, ALL YOUR WORTH: THE
ULTIMATE LIFETIME MONEY PLAN 151 (2006). Since the publishing of this
work, Professor Warren served as the Chairman of the TARP Congressional
Oversight Panel. Jody Kantor, Behind Consumer Agency Idea, a Tireless
TIMES
(Mar.
24,
2010),
Advocate,
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/25/business/25warren.html?pagewanted=1.
She was also a catalyst for the advent of the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau. Melanie Trottman, Wall Street Critic Inspired New ConsumerST.
J.
(June
20,
2009),
Protection
Agency,
WALL
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124545888032233137.html.
Prof.
Warren
eventually served as a Special Advisor to the Secretary of the Treasury on the
Bureau until August 2011. Treasury Department Announces Plans for
Leadership Transition at the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,
FIN
PROTECTION
BUREAU
(July
26,
2011),
CONSUMER
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/pressrelease/treasury-departmentannounces-plans-for-leadership-transition-at-the-consumer-financial915
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In September 2005, Alan Greenspan, then Chairman of the
Federal Reserve Board, stated that homeowners had little to worry
about regarding a potential drop in the housing market as long as
they had sufficient value built up in their homes, referring to this
value as an “equity cushion.”3 Unfortunately, some members of the
financial sector began promoting and encouraging homeowners to
extract the value from this equity cushion by taking out multiple
mortgages and home equity lines of credit to often finance mere
personal spending and other investments unrelated to the home.4
Chairman Greenspan and his colleague, James Kennedy, later
attested to the fact that this practice of extracting the equity of
one’s home accounted for eighty percent of the rise in mortgage
debt between 1990 and 2007.5 In 2008, a heavy price was paid
when this spending binge gave way to buy-outs, bailouts, and

protection-bureau/.
3. Remarks by Chairman Alan Greenspan, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE
FED.
RES.
SYS.
(Sept.
26,
2005),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2005/20
0509262/default.htm. San Francisco Federal Reserve Governor Susan Schmidt
Bies was also known to refer to a cushion of equity in the same year, stating
that most homeowners have more than enough value in their homes even
considering a potential drop in the market. Remarks by Governor Susan
Schmidt Bies, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. SYS. (Oct. 12, 2005),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/
speeches/2005/200510122/default.htm; see also, Remarks by Governor Susan
Schmidt Bies, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. SYS. (Apr. 18, 2005),
http://www. federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2005/20050418/default.htm
(admitting just six months prior that some Americans would be considerably
less able to deal with the “shocks” that come with the rise and fall of the
market as a result of the lack of equity in their homes, but attributing this to
lower income and fewer financial assets).
4. See Ted Rechtshaffen, Turn ‘Dead’ Money into New Wealth, GLOBE AND
MAIL
(Sept.
17,
2010),
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globeinvestor/personal-finance/turn-dead-money-into-new-wealth/article1710487/
(arguing that the value of one’s home is “dead” money unless it is liquefied and
utilized for other investments or personal expenses).
5. Alan Greenspan & James Kennedy, Sources and Uses of Equity
Extracted from Homes, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. SYS. 2 (Mar.
2007),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2007/200720/200720pap.pdf.
The increase in real estate financing for secondary mortgages and home equity
lines of credit notably quadrupled the increase in financing for the purchase of
new homes, which constituted twenty percent of the increase in borrowing
against one’s home. Id. What is also remarkable is that the cash that came out
of homes was primarily used to pay down credit card debt, which according to
surveys had built up from personal consumption expenditures. Id.
Approximately $530 billion were extracted from homes every year between
1991 and 2005. Id. at 9. Chairman Greenspan attested several years prior to
the “frenetic pace” at which homeowners were extracting equity from their
homes. Thomas A. Fogarty & Sue Kirchhoff, Fed Chief: Home Prices May Vol,
TODAY
(Mar.
4,
2003),
USA
http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/fed/2003-03-04-gspanhousing_x.htm#.
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massive bank failures.6
The current American bankruptcy system codified in the
Bankruptcy Code (“the Code”) offers an answer to the crisis that
developed in part as a result of the detrimental practice of
excessive home equity extraction. Bankruptcy law has the
potential to provide an efficient solution to the current mortgage
foreclosure tragedy, as well as an incentive that will prevent
future, similar calamities. Section II of this Comment introduces
the concept of lien-stripping and outlines the various provisions of
the Code that authorize its practice, even under the so-called
“Chapter 20” case. Section III identifies the possible ambiguity
within the Code caused by the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (“BAPCPA”).7 BAPCPA has
exposed two opposing schools of thought within the bankruptcy
courts regarding the exact requirements to strip junior liens in
“Chapter 20.” Section IV examines the advantages of one view as
more conducive to the policies underlying bankruptcy, and
proposes an amendment to the Code that would clean up the
inconsistencies that currently prevent the system from operating
at its full potential.
II. LIEN-STRIPPING IN A “CHAPTER 20” BANKRUPTCY
A. Lien-Stripping: The Power to Modify Creditors’ Rights
Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 of the Code are the primary
avenues of relief for most individual debtors who file bankruptcy.
Chapter 7 is for those eligible individuals intending to liquidate
their nonexempt assets to satisfy a portion of the allowed claims
against their estate. Chapter 13 is for those eligible individuals
intending to retain possession of their nonexempt assets, and
creates a payment plan for a period of three to five years under
which the individual would pay disposable income payments to a
trustee.8 After liquidation under Chapter 7, or the completion of a
6. See TIMELINE: U.S. Financial Rescues, Failures in the Last Century,
REUTERS (Sept. 14, 2008), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2008/09/14/us-lehmanrescues-idUSN1445176620080914 (outlining the various points in American
history where financial institutions failed and required assistance from
solvent private institutions or the federal government).
7. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005,
11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1329 (2011).
8. Id. §§ 109, 701-727, 1301-1330. Chapter 11 is also available to
individual debtors whose income exceeds the limitation to qualify for Chapter
7 but lack the “regular income” required to make payments under a Chapter
13 Plan. Id. § 109. The Code defines an “individual with regular income” as
someone whose income is “sufficiently stable and regular to enable such
individual to make payments under a plan under Chapter 13 . . . .” Id.
§ 101(30). Some courts have defined “sufficiently stable and regular” to
exclude potential income to be received by the debtor pending the granting of a

Do Not Delete

918

10/18/2013 4:33 PM

The John Marshall Law Review

[46:913

plan under Chapter 13, an individual debtor is ordinarily entitled
to a discharge of all eligible debts, which essentially voids all
judgments against the debtor for personal liability for prepetition
debts.9 Regardless of which chapter of the Code the petition is filed
under, the general provisions of the Code, as well as those
governing case administration, creditors, the debtor, and the
estate, are applicable in every bankruptcy case.10
Chapter 5, in part, covers the rights and responsibilities of
creditors as they make claims upon a debtor’s estate, after the
debtor files a petition.11 Section 506 of the Code is the primary
source for determining a creditor’s status as secured or unsecured
in bankruptcy.12 It is a foundational concept of bankruptcy law
that a secured creditor’s claim against the estate is only secured to
the extent of the value of the collateral.13 Any remainder of the
claim above this value is unsecured.14 Essentially, the lien is said
to be “stripped down” where it is held at the value of the collateral
as of the date of the petition, regardless of whether the value of
the collateral subsequently rises.15
Subsection (d) of § 506 states that a lien is void to the extent
that it secures a claim that is not an “allowed secured claim.”16
Although, when taken as a whole, § 506 seems to authorize lienstripping of any secured debt down to the value of the collateral,
the Supreme Court in Dewsnup v. Timm held that § 506 does not
authorize Chapter 7 debtors to do so.17 Purportedly, the Court

professional license. In re Spurlin, 350 B.R. 716, 720 (W.D. La. 2006). Other
courts have held that a small amount of relatively fortuitous periods of
employment qualifies an individual as “an individual with regular income.”
See, e.g., Matter of Cole, 3 B.R. 346, 349 (S.D. W. Va. 1980) (holding that the
debtor’s skills were adequate enough to believe that he would continue to gain
adequate “odd-job” employment throughout his Chapter 13 case).
9. 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(1).
10. Id. § 103(a).
11. Id. §§ 501-511.
12. Id. § 506.
13. Id. § 506(a)(1). Where the debtor is in Chapters 7 or 13, the value of the
collateral is its replacement value as of the date of the bankruptcy filing. Id.
§ 506(a)(2).
14. Id. § 506(a)(1). The rule works both ways as § 506(b) provides that
where the value of the collateral exceeds the amount of a secured creditor’s
claim, the excess value justifies the accruing of interest and other costs and
fees tacked on to the underlying debt. Id. § 506(b).
15. In re King, 290 B.R. 641, 645 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2003). Where a stripdown occurs, the creditor will likely recover even less, since the trustee in
bankruptcy recovers from the value of the collateral any expenses incurred in
holding it for the benefit of the estate and secured party. 11 U.S.C. § 506(c).
16. 11 U.S.C. § 506(d). This rule is subject to two exceptions: (1) it does not
apply to any amount that has been disallowed as an unmatured debt, and (2)
it does not apply to certain amounts that may be disallowed by the court as
they fall under reimbursement or contribution. Id.
17. See Dewsnupp v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 417 (1992) (clarifying that its
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established this prohibition in order to preserve a common law
“pre-Code” imperative that liens survive bankruptcy proceedings.18
Chapter 7 debtors, however, occasionally seek additional
relief by subsequently filing under Chapter 13.19 This type of
debtor is amusingly referred to as a “Chapter 20” debtor.20 The
“Chapter 20” debtor chooses to file under Chapter 13 after
receiving a discharge under Chapter 7 in order to take advantage
of the alternative relief offered by Chapter 13.21 Because a lien on
the debtor’s home traditionally passes through Chapter 7 intact,
the debtor might receive a discharge of personal liability in
Chapter 7, but the creditor is thereafter permitted to proceed in
rem with foreclosure in state court following the bankruptcy case.
In a “Chapter 20,” the debtor simply files for bankruptcy again
(this time in Chapter 13) and prepares a reorganization plan,
which was unavailable under the prior Chapter 7 case.22 Although
the personal liability under the mortgage has already been
interpretation of the statute applies only to the facts before it, which consisted
of a Chapter 7 debtor seeking to strip an undersecured mortgage). The debtor
here defaulted on a mortgage and filed for Chapter 11 relief before the secured
party could foreclose on her property, and the bankruptcy court dismissed her
Chapter 11 petition twice. Id. at 412-13. She then filed for Chapter 7 and
asked that the court reduce the amount she owed on the note ($120,000) to the
fair market value of her home ($39,000), but the court refused to do so. Id. at
413. Recognizing that no interpretation of § 506 would be satisfactory to all,
the Court interpreted it to mean that the debtor could not strip down the
mortgage because it was a lien that was “fully allowed” under § 502. Id. at
417. The Court declined however to extend the rule all situations. Id. at 41617.
18. Id.
19. Grandstaff v. Casey (In re Casey), 428 B.R. 519, 521 (Bankr. S.D. Cal.
2010).
20. Id.
21. Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 82-83 (1991). In Johnson,
when the debtor defaulted on loans secured by his farm, his creditor filed for
foreclosure. Id. at 80. Before judgment was entered, the debtor filed for
Chapter 7, which placed an automatic stay on the foreclosure proceeding. Id.
The debtor was discharged from his personal liability to the amount owed and
his non-exempt assets were liquidated. Id. After the case was closed, the
automatic stay was lifted and the creditor proceeded to foreclose on the
property in rem. Id. Before the foreclosure sale took place, the debtor filed for
Chapter 13 and listed the foreclosing creditor’s mortgage as a claim to be
addressed by the reorganization plan. Id. at 80-81. The creditor objected,
claiming that the debtor could not address the claim in the plan because the
debtor was personally relieved of any deficiency under the Chapter 7
discharge. Id. at 81. The bankruptcy court approved the plan over the
objection, the district court reversed, and the court of appeals affirmed, based
on the argument that no claim could be listed in the Chapter 13 because of the
Chapter 7 discharge. Id. Examining the definition of a “claim” in § 101 of the
Code, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the mortgage interest that
survives a discharge is a claim that can be listed in the reorganization plan.
Id. at 84.
22. Id. at 82.
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eliminated as a result of the prior discharge, the debtor is
nevertheless entitled to list the mortgage as a “claim” against the
estate under the Chapter 13 reorganization plan.23 Thus, where
the debtor files for Chapter 13 after receiving the Chapter 7
discharge, that debtor opens up a door to further relief in the form
of a reorganization plan in which the mortgage would be listed.24
This allows the debtor to avoid foreclosure where a mere Chapter
7 discharge would be insufficient to do so.25
Under Chapter 13, the debtor can now bypass the restriction
that Dewsnup placed on § 506 of the Code by taking shelter under
§ 1322. Section 1322(b)(2) provides that under a reorganization
plan, a debtor may “modify” the rights of any of its creditors,
secured or unsecured, except for the rights of a creditor secured
only by a mortgage on the debtor’s home (the antimodification
clause).26 The Supreme Court affirmed the understanding of this
exception in Nobelman v. American Savings Bank when it
prohibited a Chapter 13 debtor from using §§ 506 and 1322 to strip
down a mortgage that was undersecured, i.e., one under which the
debtor owed more than the value of the home.27 The Court focused
in on the fact that § 1322 refers to modifying the “rights” of
creditors.28 Where a creditor has a claim that is undersecured, that
creditor is still a “holder of a secured claim” under § 1322(b)(2),
and the debtor cannot affect that creditor’s rights.29
Thus, the rule was firm in regards to stripping liens of
secured and even undersecured home mortgage creditors in
Chapter 13. But the question still remained: What if there was no
value left in the collateral? This occurs commonly where the claim
secured is under a mortgage that constitutes a junior lien, and the
value of the collateral is completely absorbed by multiple senior
liens or a single undersecured senior lien.30
In Pond v. Farm Specialist Realty, the Second Circuit faced
just such a scenario.31 Farm Specialist Realty had a $10,630.58
mortgage lien on the debtor’s property, but was fourth in priority
behind a $1,505.18 property tax lien, and two other mortgages
totaling $68,995.63.32 The value of the debtor’s home was $69,000,
and yet the value of the first three liens on it aggregated beyond
23. Id. at 84.
24. Id. at 83-84.
25. Id. at 87. It also allows the debtor to pay down any arrearage on the
mortgage loan that has accrued since the debtor fell behind on mortgage
payments. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5).
26. Id. § 1322.
27. Nobelman v. Am. Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 332 (1993).
28. Id. at 328.
29. Id. at 328-29.
30. In re Tran, 431 B.R. 230, 234 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2010).
31. Pond v. Farm Specialist Realty, 252 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 2001).
32. Id. at 123-24.
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$70,000.33 Because the value of the property was insufficient to
satisfy the creditor’s mortgage, the court allowed the plan to strip
it from the home completely.34 Accordingly, other circuits followed
the same logic, including the Third,35 Fifth,36 Sixth,37 and Eleventh

33. Id.
34. Id. at 127.
35. McDonald v. Master Fin., Inc., 205 F.3d 606 (3d Cir. 2000). In
McDonald, there was a dispute between the debtor and the creditor as to the
value of the home, but even upon the debtor’s allegation, the home only held
about $1200 less than the amount owed on a senior mortgage. Id. at 608. The
court pointed out that Justice Thomas’s opinion in Nobelman focused on the
fact that the lien in question still attached to something, and thus it was
secured, albeit undersecured. Id. at 611. But in McDonald, this was obviously
not the case, as the creditor’s lien was entitled to none of the value in the
property. Id. at 614. For this reason, the court held that the creditor’s lien on
the farm was not covered by the antimodification clause, i.e., the debtor could
“modify” the creditor’s rights under § 1322(b)(2) within his Chapter 13
reorganization plan, even to the point of stripping the wholly unsecured
mortgage. Id. at 615.
36. Bartee v. Tara Colony Homeowners Ass’n, 212 F.3d 277 (5th Cir. 2000).
In Bartee, the bankruptcy court sustained the creditor’s objection to the
debtor’s lien-stripping plan. Id. at 280. A senior lien was greater than $88,000,
while the debtor’s home was only worth $87,000. Id. at 281. The secured party
in the case was the debtor’s homeowners association, which claimed an
amount of uncollected assessments secured by a lien on the debtor’s home. Id.
Under Texas state law, there was a statutory lien for homeowners
association’s claims for assessments. Id. at 284. The debtor wished to strip
down the lien and effectively make the homeowners association an unsecured
creditor, and the association objected. Id. at 281. The association claimed that
since Nobelman’s holding was based on the rights of particular creditors
rather than the amount secured under their liens, there was no merit in
looking to the fact that the collateral had no value to support its lien. Id. at
287-88. However, the court disagreed, noting that the value in the home was
key, and because the lien was “unsupported by any value in the residence
after satisfaction of the first mortgage” it held the association’s lien unsecured.
Id. at 291.
37. Lane v. Interstate Bancorp, 280 F.3d 663, 669 (6th Cir. 2002). In Lane,
the debtors had taken out two mortgages one year apart. Id. at 665. Two years
later, they filed for relief under Chapter 13. Id. The parties agreed that the
value of the home was less than the amount owed on the senior mortgage. Id.
The court thus characterized the creditor’s junior mortgage as “totally under
water,” as opposed to the Nobleman situation of “partially under water.” Id. at
664. Just like in Bartee, the bankruptcy court and district court in Lane both
applied the minority view, and accepted the creditor’s objection to a plan that
would treat the creditor as unsecured and strip the mortgage. Id. at 665.
Noting that the terms “secured claim” and “unsecured claim” are terms of art,
the court of appeals criticized the lower court’s minority view, which treated
the differently a creditor who obtained security and one that never did. Id. at
668. The court went on to find that Congress intended to distinguish between
claims that are secured to value in some sort of collateral and those claims not
attached to collateral. Id. The court, thus, approached the question of whether
the antimodification clause applied as related to whether the debtor’s home
has “economic value.” Id. at 664. Accordingly, the district court was reversed,
and the case was remanded to conform to an interpretation of § 1322(b)(2)
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Circuits.38
B. The Impact of BAPCPA
Although the concept of lien-stripping was essentially
universal, the process by which courts went about stripping liens
varied. In one view, the strip is allowed within the process of
confirming the debtor’s Chapter 13 plan.39 In another view, the
lien is stripped within an adversary proceeding.40 Either way, one
requirement consistently applied is notice, meaning that a wholly
undersecured junior lien-holder must be notified by name within
the debtor’s Chapter 13 plan that its lien will be stripped due to

consistent with the intent of Congress. Id. at 669.
38. Tanner v. FirstPlus Fin., Inc., 217 F.3d 1357, 1360 (11th Cir. 2000). In
Tanner, a debtor financed the purchase of her home entirely by a mortgage
loan in the amount of $62,000. Id. at 1357. Less than a year later, she
obtained a loan from a creditor in the amount of $23,000. Id. at 1357-58. At
the time of her Chapter 13 filing, the home was worth $622,000. Id. at 1358.
The court bifurcated a creditor’s claim to a secured home mortgage under
§ 506(a), and then protected the secured portion under § 1322(b)(2)’s
antimodification clause. Id. at 1360. Where the bifurcation produces only an
unsecured claim, then the creditor is not entitled to protection under the
antimodification clause, and the debtor may accordingly treat the claim as it
would any other unsecured claim in her reorganization plan. Id. The court also
noted that had the creditor’s approach been taken, the lien been protected and
the property sold to satisfy all of the secured interests attached, the debtor
would still receive nothing. Id. Thus the lien-stripping approach is the more
practical of the two. See Lam v. Investors Thrift, 211 B.R. 36, 40 (B.A.P. 9th
Cir. 1997) (noting if there is no security in the collateral left to satisfy the lien,
there is nothing to preserve the creditor’s rights), appeal dismissed, 192 F.3d
1309 (9th Cir. 1999).
39. See In re Black, No. 01-11520, 2002 Bankr. LEXIS 1752, at *6 (Bankr.
N.D. Ind. Sept. 23, 2002) (confirming the debtor’s confirmation plan over
creditor’s objection that the plan strip’s its wholly undersecured lien on the
debtor’s home). In Black, the creditor was third in priority. Id. at *1. The value
of the home was insufficient to support the mortgage, and thus the debtor
sought to remove it in his Chapter 13 plan. Id. The court ordered the plan
affirmed, ruling that the lien had no value, the creditor was unsecured, and
thus the debtor could modify the creditor’s rights pursuant to § 1322(b)(2). Id.
at *6.
40. See Waters v. Money Store, 276 B.R. 879, 888 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2002)
(allowing the avoidance of a wholly undersecured junior mortgage under the
debtor’s already-confirmed plan to be contingent on the debtor completing the
plan, and dismissing the case if not consummate with the plan). Such a
proceeding would be an “adversary proceeding” under Bankruptcy Rule
7001(2). FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001(2). In Waters, the debtor’s property was worth
$87,000 around the time of the Chapter 13 filing. 276 B.R. at 880. The senior
lien holder held a mortgage securing a claim of $92,361.99. Id. Behind another
junior lienholder, a creditor had a claim of $3,999.52. Id. at 880-81. The court
ruled that the Nobelman holding applied to the undersecured senior lien. Id.
at 883. The wholly unsecured junior lien, however, was subject to the plan
under which the debtor could modify the creditor’s rights pursuant to
§ 1322(b)(2). Id. at 888.
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the insufficiency in the value of the collateral.41
Of primary import is the practice of some courts that
integrate the completion of the lien-strip with the timing of the
discharge, upon the completion of the debtor’s reorganization
plan.42 While this requirement may appear to be harmless on its
face, in the case of a “Chapter 20” debtor, it becomes considerably
more onerous. The courts following this line of reasoning place
emphasis on the timing, meaning that a “Chapter 20” debtor is
required to obtain a discharge upon the completion of the Chapter
13 plan in order to effectuate a lien-strip, even though the debtor
had already been discharged of personal liability in Chapter 7.43
Initially, this requirement had little impact upon the process.
Discharge is one of the available methods of relief within Chapter
13, so debtors would accordingly have little trouble qualifying for a
discharge in Chapter 13.44 But, a problem arose with the passing
of BAPCPA.45
BAPCPA was created with the intention to make filing for
bankruptcy more difficult for individuals.46 The most significant
41. In re Zimmerman, 276 B.R. 598, 603 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2001). In
Zimmerman, the debtors objected to a claim filed by one of its creditors. Id. at
600. Although the lien here was merely a purchase money security interest in
a vacuum, the case stands for the important lien-stripping principle that
where the Chapter 13 plan does not provide for the lien, the lien passes
through bankruptcy without being stripped regardless of the value of the
collateral. Id. at 603. After the court lifts the automatic stay, the creditor could
then foreclose on the property. Id. Thus, the plan must at the very least
acknowledge the existence of the interest, and propose some sort of treatment.
Id. Additionally, where the debtor seeks to strip the lien, the plan should
explain why the lien should be stripped. Id. For example, the plan should
explain that the collateral has been destroyed or significantly depreciated, or
as in most of these cases, the value of the property is completely absorbed by a
senior lien. Id. The debtor’s plan here failed to provide in some way for the
creditor’s lien. Id. at 604. Thus, the court denied the debtor’s claim. Id. at 606.
42. In re Stroud, 219 B.R. 388, 390 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1997). Stroud is an
example of a stripping of a judicial lien. Id. at 389. Here, General Motors
Acceptance Corporation (GMAC) won a judgment in a suit against the debtor.
Id. A lien was placed on the debtor’s home to secure the judgment. Id. The
debtor’s Chapter 13 plan did not list the lien as a secured claim, but rather
treated it as an unsecured claim. Id. The debtor moved to avoid and cancel the
lien to effectuate the treatment given under the plan. Id. The court, however,
held that the debtor would need to complete the plan in order to avoid the lien,
and if the property were sold prior to the completion of the plan, the proceeds
from the sale would be held in escrow, so that GMAC could recover from the
proceeds should the debtor fail to complete the plan. Id. at 391.
43. In re Jarvis, 390 B.R. 600, 604 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2008).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Opening Statement Sen. Chuck Grassley at the Bankruptcy Reform
GRASSLEY.SENATE.GOV
(Feb.
10,
2005),
Hearing,
http://grassley.senate.gov/news/Article.cfm?customel_dataPageID_1502=9716.
The original BAPCPA Bill, passed in 2000, was not signed by President
Clinton, amounting to a pocket veto and setting the Bill on the “back burner,”
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change enacted by the legislation was the “means test,” under
which a filing debtor’s income would be carefully scrutinized to
ensure it met rigid standards.47 Debtors who do not qualify may be
presumed to be abusing the system, and may be subject to
dismissal or transfer to Chapter 13.48
A significant restriction that the Act put into place deals with
repeat filings.49 Before BAPCPA, there was no restriction on
“Chapter 20” debtors to obtain a Chapter 13 discharge after
having been discharged in Chapter 7.50 Thus, the requirement by
some courts to obtain a subsequent discharge was no significant
obstacle.51 The “Chapter 20” debtor would complete the
reorganization plan, and most often receive a discharge under
Chapter 13.52 BAPCPA changed this by adding § 1328(f), which
states that a court cannot grant a discharge in Chapter 13 within
four years of granting a discharge in Chapter 7.53
If the stripping of a lien is, as some courts require, contingent
upon the debtor receiving a discharge after the completion of the
reorganization plan, then § 1328(f) fundamentally alters the
ability to strip liens in “Chapter 20.”54 The question of the
availability of lien-stripping for these “Chapter 20” debtors is,
thus, an ardently disputed topic among bankruptcy courts, and the
because the congressional session ended soon afterward. Id. Clinton
apparently believed the Bill was unfair and “badly flawed.” Deb Riechmann,
Clinton Vetoes Bankruptcy Bill, LUBBOCKONLINE (Dec. 19, 2000),
http://lubbockonline.com/stories/121900/upd_075-5725.shtml.
Senator
Grassley, in his 2005 statement, claimed as support for his Bankruptcy
Reform Bill that in the 1990s it was feared that the number of bankruptcy
filings would rise to 1.4 million and yet by 2004 the number of filings had
risen to 1.6 million. Opening Statement Sen. Chuck Grassley at the Bankruptcy
Reform Hearing, supra. As is discussed in Section III of this Comment,
Senator Grassley purports that BAPCPA is geared towards making it more
difficult for “high rollers who gain the current system” to file for bankruptcy.
Id. Professionals involved with the system have stated otherwise. See Robert
M. Lawless et al., Did Bankruptcy Reform Fail? An Empirical Study of
Consumer Debtors, 82 AM. BANKR. L.J. 349, 353 (2008) (suggesting that more
than any effect of targeting high-income debtors, BAPCPA gave creditors a
stronger ability to affect the circumstances of all creditors).
47. Jeanne Sahadi, The New Bankruptcy Law and You, CNN MONEY (Oct.
17, 2005), http://money.cnn.com/2005/10/17/pf/debt/bankruptcy_law/index.htm.
BAPCPA also requires debtors to meet for ninety minutes for credit counseling
within the six months prior to the bankruptcy filing. Id.
48. Id.
49. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(8) (2011) (requiring that the court refuse to
grant a discharge under Chapter 7 where the debtor had received a discharge
within the eight years prior).
50. In re Jarvis, 390 B.R. at 604.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(f).
54. Peenesh Shah, Post-BAPCPA Availability of Lien-Stripping to a
Chapter 20 Debtor, 85 AM. BANKR. L.J. 161, 162 (2011).
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answer could potentially reduce the incentive to extract home
equity.
III. ANALYSIS
The issue of whether a discharge is required in order to give
effect to a lien-strip is a starkly contested matter facing
bankruptcy courts today.55 Currently, the result of a bankruptcy is
unclear for a debtor facing numerous mortgages that are partially
or completely underwater. The debtor could lose his home despite
an attempt to take every available shelter the Code allows.56
Chapter 13 exists to protect the debtor from this fate, regardless of
the availability of a discharge. The tension between these two
sides of the lien-strip dispute is further agitated by the ambiguity
infused into the law by BAPCPA.57 Various arguments posited by
the courts can be found on both sides of the dispute. Examining
their application will expose the reality that while some resolution
may be achieved, more drastic measures are required to truly
resolve this question and restore sanity to the currently precarious
nature of financing against one’s home.
A. In re King and Courts Requiring a Discharge
When the Second Circuit allowed the debtor in Pond to strip
off its creditor’s completely undersecured mortgage, the court
made a bold move.58 All of the circuits that followed the same logic
in distinguishing Nobelman from the facts before them entered
into an area of the law that had been left uncharted by the
Supreme Court.59 But to take the issue one step further, it is
unclear how these courts would have ruled had § 1328(f) been in
force at the time.
In re King is a pre-BAPCPA case that touches upon the issue
of a subsequent discharge under “Chapter 20” and whether one is

55. David P. Leibowitz, Can a Fully Unsecured Lien Be Stripped in
Chapter 13 Without Discharge?, AM. BANKR. INST. J., July-Aug. 2011, at 30.
56. See e.g., King, 290 B.R. at 643 (noting that the junior creditor’s motive
for moving to modifying the automatic stay was to allow the junior creditor to
foreclose on the property before the close of the case).
57. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1329.
58. See Pond, 252 F.3d at 125 (noting how the Supreme Court in Nobelman
essentially left discussion of wholly undersecured liens open and declined to
rule on it). Other cases are similar. See McDonald, 205 F.3d at 611
(acknowledging that there is some ambiguity in Nobelman’s language, and
thus, the idea that a wholly unsecured mortgage escapes § 1322(b)(2)’s
antimodification clause is within its holding); Bartee, 212 F.3d at 287 (noting
that Justice Thomas, in writing the opinion for the majority in Nobelman,
advised the reader that its holding should not be interpreted as preventing the
debtor from modifying the creditor’s rights).
59. Pond, 252 F.3d at 125.
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required to strip an unsecured mortgage.60 In King, the debtors
filed under Chapter 13, converted to a Chapter 7, and received a
discharge.61 Several months later they filed under Chapter 13 and
created a reorganization plan.62 They valued their home at
$38,000, and scheduled their first mortgage at $40,000 and their
second mortgage at $48,000.63 Their proposed plan was to satisfy
any arrearage and continue making payments under the first
mortgage loan, but to strip off the second mortgage completely.64
The junior creditor failed to appear and object to the confirmation
of the plan, but later submitted a claim with instructions on postpetition mortgage payments.65
The debtors objected to this, arguing that the plan was
confirmed without objection, that the mortgage was stripped
during the plan confirmation hearing, and that the creditor was in
effect now unsecured.66 The creditor filed a motion to modify the
automatic stay so that it might foreclose on the property, arguing
among other things that Nobelman prohibits the strip, and that a
confirmation of the plan in and of itself is not sufficient to strip a
lien.67
The court first noted that the strip was not prohibited under
Nobelman, citing that many circuits, including the Second Circuit
in Pond, have allowed a strip where there is no value left in the
property to cover the junior mortgage.68 Then it addressed the
creditor’s arguments regarding whether the confirmation of the
plan was sufficient to strip the mortgage.69 The creditor argued
that case law interpreting the Code requires an adversary
proceeding to consider evidence on the value of the home in order
to strip a lien.70 The court rejected the creditor’s arguments as
being unsupported by law,71 but held that proper notice is required
within the proposed confirmation plan.72 Because the plan had
specifically addressed the creditor’s interest and proposed that it
be stripped, the plan provided proper notice.73 Accordingly, the
creditor’s motion to modify the automatic stay was denied.74

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

King, 290 B.R. at 651.
Id. at 643.
Id. at 644.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 644-45.
Id. at 645.
Id.
Id. at 646.
Id.
Id. at 645.
Id. at 647.
Id. at 648-49.
Id. at 650.
Id. at 651.
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Recall that King was decided two years before BAPCPA was
passed.75 Thus, although it dealt with the requirements to strip a
lien in “Chapter 20”, the King court was not operating within the
confines of § 1328(f).76 Subsequent post-BAPCPA cases, however,
look to King as persuasive authority in interpreting § 1328(f) and
in forming the requirements for stripping liens in Chapter 13.77
One in particular is In re Jarvis, which was decided by the same
court as King.78
In Jarvis, the court addressed the issues surrounding the
hearing for confirmation of the debtor’s Chapter 13 plan.79 The
debtor had filed for Chapter 13 approximately seven months after
receiving a discharge in Chapter 7.80 The debtor’s home was worth
$66,700, and there were two mortgages scheduled in the petition,
one securing $70,677 of debt and the other securing $8,720.81 The
debtor’s proposed plan offered to make payments to the first
mortgagee and to a secured creditor with an interest in the
debtor’s vehicle.82 Since the amount owed on the first mortgage
completely consumed the value of the home, the debtor’s plan
proposed to strip the second mortgage and treat it as unsecured.83
The court, however, denied confirmation of the plan.84
Looking back to its decision in King, the court concluded that the
strip of a lien is contingent upon the debtor receiving a discharge
order following completion of the plan.85 Here, § 1328(f)(1)
prohibited such a discharge, as the debtor had already received a
discharge within the four years prior to the date upon which the
debtor anticipated completing his Chapter 13 plan.86 Therefore,
the court concluded that because it would be unable to order a
discharge at the completion of the plan, it could not approve the
75. Id. at 641. This point is admitted by the subsequent post-BAPCPA
courts that use King as precedent to require a subsequent discharge to strip a
lien. Jarvis, 390 B.R. at 604.
76. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(f).
77. See Jarvis, 390 B.R. at 604 (deferring to the dicta in King stating that
if the debtor does not finish the plan and get a discharge, then the strip
effectuated as of the confirmation of the plan would be ineffective and the lien
would pass through bankruptcy); In re Fenn, 428 B.R. 494, 500 (Bankr. N.D.
Ill. 2010) (citing to King when holding that lien avoidance occurs at discharge);
In re Mendoza, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 664, *9 (Bankr. D. Colo. Jan. 21, 2010)
(citing to King through Jarvis to obtain the rule that permanent modification
of a secured creditor’s rights is contingent upon discharge after completion of
the reorganization plan).
78. Jarvis, 390 B.R. at 604.
79. Id. at 601.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 601-02.
82. Id. at 602.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 601.
85. Id. at 604.
86. Id. at 601.
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lien strip, and thus denied confirmation.87
In holding that the debtor was ineligible for a lien-strip
because he was ineligible for a discharge, the court adopted the
view that allowing the strip would be an expansion of the debtor’s
rights, which Congress could not have intended when it
implemented § 1328(f).88 This view has been held by other courts
for the same reason.89 Under similar facts in In re Fenn, the
Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois noted that
§ 1325(a)(5) of the Code was of primary concern to the debtor.90
Section 1325 requires among other things that in order for a court
to confirm a plan, the plan must provide for “each allowed secured
claim” in one of three ways.91 One way includes allowing the
holder of such a claim to retain its interest until either the debt is
paid off or the debtor obtains a discharge.92 Accordingly, the court
thus held that because § 1328(f) prohibited the latter discharge,
the debtor could only remove the mortgage by satisfying the
underlying debt.93
B. Hill and the Lien-Stripping Courts
In contrast, several courts have followed the view that a
discharge upon completion of the plan is irrelevant to the strip,
including the court in In re Hill.94 In Hill, the court acknowledged
the consistent use by a number of courts of the Jarvis line of
87. Id. at 607. The court in Jarvis also looked to In re Lilly, 378 B.R. 232
(Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2007), to determine the requirement of a discharge upon
completion of a Chapter 13 plan where the debtor sought to some way modify
a secured creditor’s rights. Jarvis, 390 B.R. at 605. In Lilly, the creditor held a
claim to the debtor’s vehicle. Lilly, 378 B.R. at 233. The debtor did not dispute
that the claim was actually secured. Id. Rather, the debtor sought to modify
the creditor’s rights by altering the post-petition interest rate at which the
claim was accruing. Id. The contract rate of interest was 17.95% but the
debtor sought to pay the claim at 10.5% under the reorganization plan. Id. at
234. The creditor objected. Id. at 233. The court, thus, had to determine
whether § 1325(a)(5)(B)(i)(I) prevented the debtor from doing this, as
subsection (B)(i)(I) required that a plan provide that the creditor hold the lien
until it is paid off or discharged. Id. at 234. The creditor argued that a correct
construction of this section results in a retention of the contract rate of
interest. Id. at 235. The court disagreed, stating that the debtor could modify
the interest rate under § 1325, provided that the debtor receive a discharge
upon completing the plan. Id. at 235-36.
88. Jarvis, 390 B.R. at 605-06.
89. See Fenn, 428 B. R. at 503 (noting that Congress did not have the
intention of expanding debtors’ rights).
90. Id. at 500; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5) (2011) (pointing to the
debtor’s acceptance of the plan and retention of the lien; Fenn, 428 B.R. at 502
(explaining that this section of the Code was added through BAPCPA).
91. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(i)(I).
92. Id.
93. Fenn, 428 B.R. at 500.
94. In re Hill, 440 B.R. 176, 181-82 (2010).
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reasoning, but believed that the requirements for a lien-strip tie
more into the Code’s rules on the sufficiency of a reorganization
plan, instead of the rules regarding the availability of a
discharge.95 The court deferred to the logic established in Johnson
v. Home State Bank, in which the Supreme Court acknowledged
that a “Chapter 20” debtor, upon filing for Chapter 13 to create a
reorganization plan, has already obtained a discharge of his
personal liability to the debt.96 The Hill court, thus, saw the
requirement of any subsequent discharge as being “redundant.”97
In re Tran is another leading case on the issue of “Chapter 20”
lien-stripping without the requirement of a subsequent
discharge.98 In Tran, the court additionally looked to § 109, which
examines who is eligible to be a debtor.99 The court noted that
nowhere in this section is a debtor’s eligibility for relief under
Chapter 13 contingent upon the debtor’s eligibility for a
discharge.100 Additionally, the court noted that § 1325 does not
mention any requirement that the debtor be qualified for a
discharge in order for the court to confirm the debtor’s proposed
plan.101
The court also made a distinction between the reinstatement
of a lien where a case is dismissed pursuant to § 349(b)(1)(C), and
the completion of a confirmed plan where a case is considered
closed.102 These considerations are the principal statutory
constructions used to evince an understanding of the Code that
allows for lien-stripping even absent the availability of a
subsequent discharge like in a “Chapter 20” case.103
95. Id.
96. Johnson, 501 U.S. at 82-83.
97. Hill, 440 B.R. at 182.
98. In re Tran, 431 B.R. 230, 235 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2010).
99. Id. at 235; 11 U.S.C. § 109.
100. Tran, 431 B.R. at 235.
101. Id. It is interesting to note what the court intends by this statement.
Section 1325 does require that a plan provide for a discharge pursuant to
§ 1328
for
the
plan
to
be
confirmed
under
§ 1325(a)(5)(B).
§ 1325(a)(5)(B)(i)(I)(bb). The court seems to bypass this by emphasizing
subsection (II) of § 1325(a)(5)(B)(i), which only provides for the reinstatement
of a stripped lien where the case is dismissed without the completion of the
plan. Tran, 431 B.R. at 235.
102. Id.
103. It is also commonly held that there is no clear language in the Code
regarding the availability of a discharge as a condition to obtaining a lien
strip. Hart v. San Diego Credit Union, 449 B.R. 783, 792-93 (S.D. Cal. 2010).
In Hart, the District Court for the Southern District of California reviewed an
order of the bankruptcy court conditioning the debtors’ lien avoidance motion
on the receipt of a discharge. Id. at 784. The debtors had previously received a
discharge in Chapter 7. Id. at 785. In Chapter 13, the trustee objected to the
proposed Chapter 13 reorganization plan, which led to a hearing. Id. at 78485. However, before the hearing was held the debtors moved to avoid a junior
lien that was completely undersecured, and scheduled a separate hearing
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C. Good Faith as the “Chapter 20” Gatekeeper
Some bankruptcy professionals propose that the only
meaningful restriction on lien-stripping, even where a discharge is
unavailable, is the requirement that the Chapter 13 petition be
filed in good faith.104 In fact, the court has a duty to raise sua
sponte the issue of good faith where needed.105 For example, in
Tran, the court noted that its own holding regarding the
irrelevance of the debtor’s eligibility for a subsequent discharge
beyond the hearing for the trustee’s objection. Id. at 785. The court ordered a
continuance since notice was defective, and at the later hearing, the court
struggled to reconcile the debtor’s motion with the rationale in Dewsnup, as
the debtors would have been unable to obtain the avoidance if they were still
in Chapter 7. Id. The bankruptcy court eventually granted the motion, but
prohibited the avoidance on the basis of § 506(d), and rather allowed it under
§ 1322(b)(2). Id. In doing so, the court also required that the plan be completed
and a subsequent discharge be obtained in order to avoid the lien. Id. The
debtors appealed to the district court to determine whether the bankruptcy
court erred in refusing to use § 506 to strip the lien, whether the requirement
of a discharge was in error, and whether § 1322(b)(2) could be used to avoid
liens in the first place. Id. at 786. The mortgagee relied substantially on the
holding and ratio given by Jarvis. Id. at 790. The district court answered by
distinguishing the facts from those in Jarvis, noting that Jarvis ruled the way
it did based on the precedent set by King. Id. at 792. The court noted that
California had no King of its own, and thus was free to decide whether it
believed the debtor still had the right to avoid the lien under § 1328(f). Id. The
court, thus, reversed the order granted by the bankruptcy court, holding that
the debtors could avoid and strip the lien pursuant to § 506 in Chapter 13, and
that the avoidance was good upon confirmation of the plan, not upon a
subsequent discharge after the completion of the plan. Id. at 792-93.
104. See Leibowitz, supra note 55, at 71 (claiming “[t]he issue is not whether
there is a discharge; it is whether the debtor has acted in good faith”). Mr.
Leibowitz suggests the current trend is that courts are increasingly approving
“Chapter 20” lien-strips, and as long as this continues, the “next wave” of suits
will be geared toward and centered on this requirement of good faith. Id. at 30.
He divides the discharge-requiring cases into two camps, those that prohibit
lien-stripping on the basis of § 1328(f), and those that do so on the belief that
it violates the principle laid down in Dewsnup, that a debtor may not strip
liens in Chapter 7. Id. Mr. Leibowitz, opposing both camps, asserts that § 1328
is not as applicable as these cases assume, because it does not refer to liens at
all. Id. He believes rather that lien-stripping is a relief far more complex than
mere discharge, and thus, it is not covered by § 1328(f). Id. Instead, the
process of lien-stripping is and always was based on a balance between §§ 506
and 1322(b)(2). Id. On the other hand, Mr. Shah argues that the unavailability
of the discharge is dispositive on the issue. Shah, supra note 54, at 176. Mr.
Shah bases his argument on a combination of looking at the Code as a whole,
using basic rules of statutory construction, and deferring to the reasoning in
Dewsnup. Id. Where Dewsnup construed the language of “allowed secured
claim” in § 506(d) to essentially mean an allowed claim that was at least at
one point secured, the same construction should be applied to the same term
in § 1325(a)(5). Id.
105. See Hill, 440 B.R. at 184 (holding that the court has an “independent
duty” to ensure that the good faith requirements of § 1325 are met before
confirming the plan).
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was not dispositive to its analysis of the debtor’s eligibility for a
lien-strip.106 It also noticed that the debtor’s plan intended to cure
very little of the arrearages owed to the secured parties, and that
there were no tax liens or other unsecured debt under the plan.107
Additionally, the court noted that the debtor was actually legally
solvent.108 For these reasons, the court found the debtor’s Chapter
13 petition was nothing short of a bad faith attempt to bypass
Dewsnup’s prohibition of lien-strips in Chapter 7.109
In contrast, Hill decided another way. The court compared
and distinguished the circumstances surrounding the Hills’s
Chapter 13 petition to those of the debtor in Tran.110 The Court
noted first that the debtors were insolvent and that Mr. Hill was
unemployed until shortly before the Chapter 13 petition was
filed.111 Upon noting the liberality in the plan, which sought to
satisfy student loans, $18,000 on the senior mortgage on their
home, and taxes, the court found that the Hills had substantively
acted in good faith in their Chapter 13 petition and proposed
reorganization plan.112 The court held that they acted in good faith
in filing the Chapter 13 petition, and accordingly allowed the
completely unsecured mortgage to be stripped.113 Good faith, thus,
became the prime standard with which cases like Hill and Tran
police a “Chapter 20” debtor’s eligibility for stripping a completely
undersecured lien rather than the requirement of a subsequent
106. Tran, 431 B.R. at 237. The definition of good faith, like most areas of
the law, is difficult under § 1325 as well. Deans v. O’Donnell, 692 F.2d 968,
972 (4th Cir. 1982). A general test has been to determine whether the debtor
appears to be attempting an “abuse of the provisions, purpose, or spirit of the
chapter in the proposal.” Kitchens v. GA R.R Bank and Trust Co., 702 F.2d
885, 888 (11th Cir. 1983). Additionally, there is sometimes a distinction made
between filing a Chapter 13 petition in good faith, and proposing a Chapter 13
reorganization plan in good faith. See In re Love, 957 F.2d 1350, 1354 (7th Cir.
1992) (noting the two separate good faith analyses required of the court in a
Chapter 13 case). One analysis is required to file the petition in the first place,
and the other is required to determine the confirmation of the debtor’s
proposed reorganization plan). Id. The Seventh Circuit in Love made the
distinction that under the former analysis, the consequences can be far more
drastic to the debtor. Id. Where the court finds a lack of good faith in the filing
of a Chapter 13 petition, the entire case can be dismissed and terminated, or
even converted to a Chapter 7 proceeding, under which the debtor would be
unable to restructure his debt. Id. On the other hand, where a lack of good
faith is found in the proposal of a reorganization plan, the court could still
dismiss, but is more likely to merely deny confirmation of the plan. Id.
107. Id. at 238.
108. Id.
109. Id. Because the debtor could not strip the lien in Chapter 7, the court
reasoned she filed the Chapter 13 petition for the overwhelming purpose of
accomplishing what she could not in Chapter 7. Id.
110. Hill, 440 B.R. at 184.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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discharge.114
IV. PROPOSAL FOR UNIFORMITY
The “equity cushion” built up in one’s home, referred to by
Chairman Greenspan, is the proper safeguard against a downturn
in the real estate market.115 But when this cushion is instead used
as the homeowner’s private line of credit, its ability to protect is
diminished or even eliminated. On a broad scale, the elimination
of this safeguard could lead to severe financial destruction. The
prevention of excessive home equity extraction is a relatively
manageable burden that can be passed to secured lenders and
incentivized through the bankruptcy system. The lender, as the
party to the loan transaction with the greater likelihood of market
expertise, knows of the potential consequences that could arise
should the real estate market fall. Thus, the lender should be less
willing to extend excessive credit secured by a junior mortgage in
the borrower’s home, in order to avoid its interest being stripped in
bankruptcy. The line of circuit court cases post-Nobelman sealed
the fate for wholly unsecured creditors facing a typical Chapter 13
lien-strip, but the bankruptcy court split over the issue of whether
a subsequent discharge is required has compromised the efficiency
of the system. This, together with BAPCPA’s repeat-discharge
restriction in § 1328(f), has severely diminished the effectiveness
of the lien-stripping tool in bankruptcy court. The resolution of
this issue in favor of a clear authorization to strip liens at the time
of confirmation, regardless of the debtor’s ability to obtain a
second discharge, would create a clear direction for bankruptcy
courts. It would also be an obvious incentive for home-equity-line114. The problem posed by this mechanism is that there is no solidified test
to determine good faith, rather the analysis is left completely to the discretion
of the bankruptcy court judge. Fin. One of GA, Inc. v. McKithian, 23 B.R. 268,
271 (N.D. Ga. 1982). On top of this, courts must add to the test the various
income considerations BAPCPA added to the Code. Baxter v. Johnson, 346
B.R. 256, 261 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2006). In Kitchens, the court listed a number of
factors to be included in an analysis of good faith, including: the amount of the
debtor’s income, any basic living expenses incurred by the debtor and the
debtor’s family, attorney’s fees, expected duration of the Chapter 13 plan, the
debtor’s motivation for seeking Chapter 13 relief, the debtor’s degree of effort
and ability to earn, any medical expenses, debtor’s previous bankruptcy
filings, and the debtor’s eligibility for a discharge. Kitchens, 702 F.2d at 88889. The court in Baxter rightly noted that many of these factors were
subsumed into § 1325 by BAPCPA. Baxter, 346 B.R. at 262. But leaving the
good faith analysis completely to the discretion of the judge means that the
decision is made essentially independent of the same analyses done by other
courts. Schaffer v. IRS, 95 B.R. 62, 65 (E.D. MI 1988).
115. Remarks by Chairman Alan Greenspan, supra note 3. It appears
Chairman Greenspan was in fact referring to the “equity cushion” as a shock
absorber for market downturn rather than its potential as collateral for future
loans. Id.
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of-credit lenders to take a second look at how secured they really
are, and whether it would be prudent and in their best interest to
extend such credit to riskier borrowers.
As it stands, the case of Johnson v. Home State Bank, in
particular, gives crucial insight into the nature of a discharge.116
Johnson shows how a discharge has no effect on a lien interest and
thus no bearing on the strip of a lien.117 Admittedly, Johnson’s
presence does not eliminate the possibility of clarifying this issue
through a simple amendment to the Code, with an express
provision authorizing the practice of lien-stripping in “Chapter 20”
without a second discharge.
A. Johnson and the Nature of a Discharge
The prime issue before the Supreme Court in Johnson was
whether the “Chapter 20” debtor could list the secured creditor’s
mortgage on the debtor’s farm as a claim to be addressed by the
debtor’s proposed plan, where the debtor, as a result of the
Chapter 7 discharge, had no personal liability left in the claim.118
The Chapter 13 filing interrupted and stayed the foreclosure sale
that was about to take place.119 The Court held that the debtor
could include the secured creditor’s interest as a claim in Chapter
13, over the secured creditor’s objection.120 In laying out the
opinion, the Court cuts to the very nature of a discharge, that it
“extinguishes only one mode of enforcing a claim, namely, an
action against the debtor in personam, while leaving intact
another, namely, an action against the debtor in rem.”121 This
insight sheds inescapable doubt on the rationale of the courts that
require a discharge to give effect to a lien strip, as what exactly
could a subsequent discharge do to strip the lien from the
mortgage if by the very nature of a discharge it can only relieve
personal liability? The answer is that it in fact does nothing to
alter the attachment of a security interest, because after
discharge, the secured creditor can always proceed in rem. Thus,
in light of Johnson, to require a subsequent discharge in “Chapter
20” in order to give effect to a lien strip is frivolous at best and
certainly not a requirement. In deferring to Johnson and referring
to a subsequent discharge as “redundant,” the Hill court comes
closest to accepting the full logical framework handed down by the
Supreme Court in Johnson.122

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Johnson, 501 U.S. at 84.
Id.
Id. at 80-81.
Id.
Id. at 84-85.
Id. at 84.
Hill, 440 B.R. at 182.
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B. Amending the Code
Congressional action would be the most effective catalyst for
unifying the courts. If Congress is to pass effective legislation on
lien-stripping, the Bill should be concise and direct, as the courts
have already brought the system close to where it needs to be.123
The language of the Bill should both clarify that lien-stripping
relief is possible upon the mere completion of a Chapter 13 plan
and codify the holding of the post-Nobelman courts.124
The first amendment to Chapter 13 would modify 1322(b)(2)
and would read as follows:
. . . [the plan may] upon plan confirmation and without regard the
availability of a discharge under § 1328, modify the rights of holders
of secured claims, other than a claim secured only by a security
123. Some seem to suggest that Congress need not make any changes to
effect change in this way. For example, in In re Fair the Bankruptcy Court for
the Eastern District of Wisconsin pointed out that Congress, in drafting
§ 1328(f), did not draft “on a clean slate.” 450 B.R. 853, 857 (E.D. Wis. 2011).
The court there logically presumed that when Congress enacted § 1328(f), it
knew full well the difference between a discharge of in personam liability and
the modification of in rem liability. Id. “In many Chapter 13 cases, ‘it is the
ability to reorganize one’s financial life and pay off debts, not the ability to
receive a discharge, that is the debtor’s holy grail.’” Id. (citing In re Bateman,
515 F.3d 272, 283 (4th Cir. 2008)). Nevertheless, the presence of so stark a
split amongst the courts on the matter evinces a need for congressional clarity.
124. This is something that proposed legislation has overlooked in favor of a
more broadly sweeping amendment to the Code. The Helping Families Save
Their Homes Act of 2009, for example, sought to eliminate the
antimodification clause altogether. H.R. 1106, 111th Cong. § 103 (2009). The
Bill attempted to amend § 1322 to allow the debtor to modify the rights of any
home mortgage creditor. Id. The post-Nobelman courts already permit this to
a reasonable extent: upon the demonstration that the mortgage loan is
completely undersecured. Pond, 252 F.3d at 127. Under those circumstances,
the mortgage creditor does not even qualify for the protection of § 1322(b)(2),
since its claim is no longer secured at all under § 506, and thus it is not
covered by the § 1322(b)(2) exception. Id. The antimodification clause, as noted
by Justice Stevens in his concurring opinion to Nobelman, was intended by
Congress to promote the “flow of capital” into the residential real estate
market. Nobelman, 508 U.S. at 332 (Stevens, J., concurring). The purpose
behind the antimodification clause would thus be preserved by a codification of
the holding of the post-Nobelman courts, since the junior mortgages most
likely to be stripped were not taken in exchange for a loan to purchase the
home in the first place, which is the type of financing Justice Stevens appears
to be referring to. If one looks at any of the mortgages stripped by the postNobelman courts, one finds that they sanctioned the stripping of a mortgage
that was wholly undersecured, and it was wholly undersecured because it was
a junior mortgage, securing a secondary loan, behind the senior mortgage that
was used to finance the purchase of the home. Pond, 252 F.3d at 123-24;
McDonald, 205 F.3d at 608; Bartee, 212 F.3d at 281; Lane 280 F.3d at 665;
Tanner 217 F.3d at 1357-58. Priority was acknowledged for the senior
mortgages—those mortgages taken in exchange for the financing of the
purchase of the home—the type of mortgages protected both by § 1322(b)(2)
and by Nobelman. Nobelman, 508 U.S. at 332.
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interest in real property that is the debtor’s principal residence,
provided the value of the collateral is sufficient to at least partially
secure such a claim. . . .125

Another amendment would add similar language to
§ 1325(a)(5) to clarify that a wholly undersecured mortgage is not
protected by the requirements of § 1325(a)(5). It would read as
follows:
(5) with respect to each allowed secured claim provided for by the
plan, for which the value of the collateral is sufficient to at least
partially secure such a claim-126

125. Since the current language in § 1322(b)(2) is already riddled with
confusing commas and clauses, it should also be reformatted with new
subsections, in addition to the proposed language. Section 1322(b)(2) would
thus read as follows:
(B) Subject to subsections (a) and (c) of this section, the plan may— . . .
(2) upon plan confirmation and without regard the availability of a
discharge under § 1328(A) modify the rights of holders of secured claims, other than a
claim secured only by a security interest in real property that is
the debtor’s principal residence, provided the value of the
collateral is sufficient to at least partially secure such a claim,
(B) modify the rights of holders of unsecured claims, or
(C) leave unaffected the rights of holders of any class of claims;
126. Section 1325(a)(5) would thus in part read as follows:
(A) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), the court shall
confirm a plan if . . .
(5) with respect to each allowed secured claim provided for by the
plan, for which the value of the collateral is sufficient to at least
partially secure such a claim(A) the holder of such claim has accepted the plan;
(B)
(i) the plan provides that(I) the holder of such claim retain the lien securing the
claim until the earlier of(aa) the payment of the underlying debt determined
under nonbankruptcy law; or
(bb) discharge under section 1328; and
(II) if the case under this chapter is dismissed or converted
without completion of the plan, such lien shall also be
retained by such holder to the extent recognized by
applicable nonbankruptcy law;
(ii) the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to
be distributed under the plan on account of such claim is not
less than the allowed amount of such claim; and
(iii) if(I) property to be distributed pursuant to this subsection is
in the form of periodic payments, such payments shall be in
equal monthly amounts; and
(II) the holder of the claim is secured by personal property,
the amount of such payments shall not be less than an
amount sufficient to provide to the holder of such claim
adequate protection during the period of the plan; or
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The addition of this language would reflect the logic of the
post-Nobelman courts, acknowledging that a wholly undersecured
junior mortgagee is not entitled to the same protections as secured
creditors. It also provides a clear tool of statutory construction for
the timing of a lien-strip, so that the four-year mandate between
serial discharges no longer impacts courts’ ability to strip a wholly
unsecured mortgage in “Chapter 20.”
V. CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that the adherence to an entire collection of
sound legal and financial principles will be necessary to prevent
another financial crisis. However, the sweeping destruction caused
in part by the excessive extraction of equity from one’s home for
personal finances played a large role in exacerbating what could
have been a much more manageable economic downturn. With
clear guidelines on the authority and process of stripping liens in
bankruptcy court, secured lenders will be better equipped to assess
the risks of extending credit to debtors. Greater risk for lenders
will in turn inhibit a homeowner’s ability to extract equity from
the home, limit unnecessary consumer spending, and provide the
needed home equity cushion to soften the effect of market
downturns.

(C) the debtor surrenders the property securing the claim to such
holder;

